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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

• STATEMENT O F ISSUES PRESENTED b ( )R REVIEW
1.

Whetlier the trial court erred by dismissing the Petition to Modify Decree

of Divorce filed by Defendant/Appellant, Stephen G Homer ("Mr. Homer")
S 1 A T E M E N T OF THE CASE. ••
Homer filed his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce in July of
1999. Plaintiff/Appellee, Kathe C. Homer ("Ms. Homer") filed her Motion to Dismiss
on August 9" 1999

\ heai ing

>' "" ' M '<' '"" I *, | <> "'

"' ^ %i,y»| ?' * I (* W j y 11 ;« • i i i > n > i

October 29, 1999. The court took the matter under advisement and issued its ruling
dismissing Mr. Homer's Petition on November 1

!

adim:^ ui bact and Order

Dismissing;
Mr. Homer filed his Notice of Appeal on December 2 1 , 1999.

1999.

n

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Homer and Ms. Homer were divorced, after nine years of marriage, by a
Decree of Divorce entered in October of 1989. Under the terms of the Decree, Mr.
Homer was ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Homer in the amount of $150.00 commencing
July 1989. (R. at 306).
In August of 1999, Mr. Homer filed a Petition for Modification of Decree of
Divorce. (R. at 448), seeking to terminate his obligation to pay alimony to Ms. Homer.
Mr. Homer's sole basis for terminating his alimony obligation was the 1995 amendment
UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5 (1953, as amended) which limited alimony, except in

extenuating circumstances, to a period equivalent to the duration of the marriage. He did
not allege that any changed circumstances with respect to either Ms. Homer's income or
expenses or his own had occurred since entry of the Decree.
At the time Mr. Homer filed his Petition, Ms. Homer had neither remarried nor
cohabited. Ms. Homer filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr. Homer's Petition and filed a
Memorandum in Support of her Motion. (R. at 449-454).
In October of 1999, the lower court heard arguments on Ms. Homer's Motion to
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. In its Ruling of November 1, 1999, the
lower court granted Ms. Homer's Motion and dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition. (R. at
482-489). Findings of Fact and Order Dismissing Petition to Modify were entered on
November 29, 1999. (R. at 490-498).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MR.
HOMER'S PETITION FOR MODD7ICATION OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD
REAFFIRMED

In his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, Mr. Homer failed to allege
that any substantial change of circumstances had ou mini

nu i 1111 >. nl (In hn, HT nf

oerly dismissed his Petition. The lower court's decision
should be affirmed.

II.

MR. HOMER'S APPEAL IS I K I Y U I A J U S AISV ivia.
HOMER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S
FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Ms. Homer has incurred attorney's fees (luc In \\\v iu.'< c^ny nl deU'iulmg ,ij.!,iUii^t
fication of Decree of Divorce and against his appeal of
the lower court's ruling, and she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred
in connection with this action.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MR.
HOMER'S PETITION FOR MODD7ICATION OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD
BEAFFntMED
Homer argues that his alimony obligation to Ms. Homer should be terminated

and relies on tne

amenar:

n

3

s

amended) which limits an award of alimony, absent extenuating circumstances, to a
period equivalent to the duration of the marriage in support of his claim. Mr. Homer's
argument is without merit and the lower court properly dismissed his Petition for several
reasons.
First of all, Mr. Homer failed to allege that there had been any substantial or
material change in circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce as required by
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Mr. Homer's sole basis for terminating his alimony obligation
was the 1995 amendment to Section 30-3-5(7)(h).
When the parties were divorced in 1989, Section 30-3-5(5) and (6), UTAH CODE
ANN. provided that alimony would terminate upon the recipient's remarriage or
cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex. In 1995, subsection (7)(h) was enacted to
limit an award of alimony, absent extenuating circumstances, to a period equivalent to
the duration of the marriage. Mr. Homer argued that, therefore, subsection (7)(h)
required the lower court to terminate his obligation to pay alimony as a matter of law.
The lower court, however, found that subsection (7)(h) was not dispositive of the
issues raised in Mr. Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce.

It

determined that that subsection merely limited the equitable powers of the court in
awarding alimony. Contrary to Mr. Homer's argument, the subsection did not require the
court to terminate previously entered alimony awards that extended beyond the duration
of the marriage.

4

Second, Mr. Homer's argument that the amendment to the statute, if it does not
apply to him, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, is without merit. He argues that the amendment creates two classes
of obligors, i.e., those who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced
prior to the effective date of the amendment, and those who only pay alimony for a
period equivalent to the duration of the marriage because they were divorced after
enactment of the amendment.
The lower court properly concluded that the amendment does not violate these
constitutional provisions because it does not create two classes of obligors. In its ruling,
the lower court stated:
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and
Uniform Operation of Law Clauses apply whenever the
government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and
treat them differently. Subsection (7)(h) does not violate
these principles however, because it does not create any type
of classification, or treat one group any different than another.
Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive law
regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the
courts in awarding alimony for a period longer than the
marriage existed.
(R. at 485).
Finally, the lower court concluded that Mr. Homer was required to meet the same
burden both pre- and post-enactment of the amendment, and that, therefore, subsection
(7)(h) did not create different classifications of obligors, or treat Mr. Homer any
differently than other similarly situated individuals who are obligated to pay alimony.

5

Specifically, it found that Mr. Homer "is not now treated any differently under
Subsection (7)(h) than he was at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered." The
standard Mr. Homer must meet in order to terminate his alimony obligation is the same
now as it was when the Decree was entered, i.e., he has the burden to "show a
substantial change of circumstances, subsequent to the decree, that was not originally
contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P. 2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Prior to 1995, this was Mr. Homer's burden to establish; even with the
enactment of Subsection (7)(h), his burden remains unchanged. Because he failed to meet
his burden, the lower court properly dismissed his Petition for Modification for Decree
of Divorce. This Court should affirm the decision of the lower court dismissing Mr.
Homer's Petition.
H.

MR. HOMER'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND MS.
HOMER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S
FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure defines a frivolous appeal as one
that "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
Mr. Homer's appeal has no legal or factual basis and is, therefore, a frivolous
appeal. See Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Ms. Homer
has incurred attorney's fees and costs because of the necessity of defending against Mr.
Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and against this appeal.

6

Mr. Homer, as a practicing attorney, has chosen to represent himself in the
proceedings in the lower court and in this appeal of the lower court's decision. He has
not incurred attorney's fees. Ms. Homer had no choice but to retain counsel to protect
her alimony award. It is fair and reasonable that this Court should award her the
attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in connection with this action.
CONCLUSION
The lower court dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of
Divorce because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He had not
alleged that there had been any substantial and material changes of circumstances since
entry of the Decree that were not foreseeable at the time of the Decree. Instead, Mr.
Homer relied on the enactment of the amendment to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5,

specifically subsection (7)(h) as the sole reason his alimony obligation should be
terminated. His reliance was misplaced. As the lower court properly concluded, the
amendment merely limits the equitable powers of the court in awarding alimony; it does
not terminate previously entered awards of alimony. The amendment does not create two
different classes of obligors, as Mr. Homer was required prior to its enactment and since
to meet his burden and show that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred
since entry of the Decree of Divorce in order to terminate his alimony obligation. He
failed to meet his burden. The lower court properly dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition for
Modification of Decree of Divorce.

7

Ms. Homer has incurred attorney's fees and costs defending against Mr. Homer's
Petition and this frivolous appeal, and she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of June, 2000.

GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON

&JL

_^

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this
2000.
Stephen G. Homer, Pro Se
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHE C. HOMER,

DECREE OF DIVORCE /

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN G. HOMER,
Civil No. 87 2098
Defendant.
This matter came on before the Honorable Ray M. Harding for
trial on the 13th day of July, 1989.
and

The Plaintiff was present

represented by her attorney, Richard B. Johnson.

The

Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Brent D.
Young.

The Court, after having entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.
against

The Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from and
the

Defendant

upon

the grounds of

irreconcilable

differences which Decree shall become final upon entry of the
same in the records of the Clerk of the Court.
2.

The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody,

and control of the minor child of the parties subject to the

EXHIBIT "A"

Defendant's right to visit with the child at reasonable times and
places.

Specifically, the Defendant shall be allowed to visit as

follows:
(a)

Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to

Sunday

night

at

6:00

p.m. with the child

to be

returned one hour prior to church and may pickup the
child one hour after church is over.
(b)

During the week in which the Defendant does not

have overnight visitation, he shall be allowed to
visit with the child on Wednesday evening from 5:00
p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
(c)

The Defendant shall have the right to visit with

the child on alternate holidays from 10:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m.

Holidays shall be January 1, President's

Day, Memorial Day, Easter, July 4, July 24, Labor Day,
Thanksgiving and Christmas as hereinafter defined.
(d)

The Christmas holiday shall be divided between

the parties.

The Christmas vacation will be the time

that the child is out of school for Christmas.

During

1989, the Defendant shall have the right to the child
from the time the children are out of school through
December 25 at 2:00 p.m.

The Plaintiff shall have the

right to the child from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until
2

minor child about the other,
(i)

All visitation periods shall be exercised in a

prompt manner so that both parties can make their
plans accordingly.

The noncustodial parent shall pick

the child up from the front steps of the custodial
parent's residence no earlier than

15 minutes prior

and no later than 15 minutes after the visitation
period commences.

Return of the child to the front

steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also
be subject to the 15 minute rule.

The custodial

parent shall have the child fed and ready on time for
visitation with sufficient clothing packed and ready
for the visitation period.
(j)

In the event the child is ill and unable to

visit, a makeup visitation will be allowed to the
noncustodial parent on the next succeeding weekend.
However, if the noncustodial parent fails for any
reason not to exercise his visitation for reasons of
health or for any other reason, there will be no
makeup visitation.
(k)

The child will not be permitted to determine

whether she wishes to visit with the noncustodial
parent.

Personal plans of the custodial parent or
4

the child goes back to school.

The parties shall

rotate from year to year the part of the Christmas
vacation that they have with the child.
(e) The child shall be with the father, the Defendant
herein, on Father's Day and his birthday from 10:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
the

Plaintiff

birthday.

The child shall be with the mother,

herein,

on Mother's

Day

and her

Father's Day and Mother's Day as with other

holidays shall take precedence over normal weekend
visitation.
(f)

As it relates to summer visitation, two weeks of

summer visitation shall be allowed.
(g)

It is ordered that if holidays occur on a Friday

or a Monday and the Defendant is entitled to the
weekend visitation either immediately before or after
the holiday, he shall have the right to have the child
for weekend visitation and the holiday without the
need of bringing the child back to the Plaintiff.
(h)

All visitation in this case shall occur at the

curb side and the Defendant is restrained from coming
onto the premises of the Plaintiff.

Neither party

shall annoy or harass the other party and neither
party

shall make any disparaging
3

comments to the

child, school activities, church activities, or other
consideration will not be reasons for failing to
adhere to the visitation schedule set forth in the
order.

Only substantial medical reasons will be

considered sufficient for postponement of visitation.
(1)

Both parties will provide addresses and contact

telephone

numbers

to the other

party

and will

immediately notify the other party of any emergency
circumstances or substantial changes in the health of
the child.
(m)

The noncustodial parent s h a l l , i n addition to the

v i s i t a t i o n s e t forth i n t h i s order, have the unlimited
right

to

parties

correspond
and

to

with

telephone

the

minor

the

minor

child

of

child

the

during

reasonable hours without i n t e r f e r e n c e or monitoring by
the

custodial

parent

or

anyone

e l s e , in

Phone &sf/s <\v\a/ oiUr

Correspondence <Xf£ ktpr

ttaiesis

agreed

otherwise

to

between

any wayv so «*

uvtftiV rtAscx^bfe. -/rvm^j.

the

parties^

telephone contfereixQ^sbetween the nonsu^waTal parent
and the c h i l d s h a l l be^4*J&ited--tGno more than once
per week and^^shSll be, in t o t a l , 15 minutes^tr1^^^ssin
djw?tf€ion.
(n)

Both p a r t i e s

are restrained

and enjoined

from

making derogatory and disparaging comments about the
5

other party or in any other way diminishing the love,
respect, and affection that the child has for either
party.
(o)

Defendant shall give Plaintiff 48 hours advance

notice

if he

does

not

intend

to

exercise

any

visitation set out herein.
3.
at

The Plaintiff is awarded the home and property located

1015 East 500 North, Orem, Utah, free and clear of any

interest of the Defendant and the Defendant is ordered to quit
claim any right, title or interest that he has in the home and
property to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff shall be responsible to

pay any debts and obligations owing on the property and shall
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
4.

The Defendant is awarded the home and property located

at 2877 West 9150 South in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah,
free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff
is ordered to quit claim any interest that she has in the home
and property to the Defendant.

The Defendant is required to pay

all debts and obligations associated with the property and shall
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
5.

As it relates to the personal property of the parties,

each of the parties is awarded the personal property in their
possession as of the time of the trial in this case free and
6

clear of any interest of the other party•

To the extent that any

item of personal property held by a party is titled, the other
party shall be required to sign any documents effecting the
division of property.
6.

No offset is required as part of an overall equitable

property settlement in this case and the award of the automobiles
as they existed at the time of trial is confirmed..
7.

As it relates to the debts and obligations of the

marriage, there are no debts and obligations of the marriage
with the exception of the obligations each of the parties owe on
the real property awarded to them herein.

Each of the parties is

responsible to pay any separately incurred debts and obligations
since the time of their separation.

As it relates to any medical

expenses that are owed for the minor child, the claims for said
sums shall be submitted to the respective insurance carriers and
each of the parties shall pay one-half of any amounts not
covered.
8.

Each of the parties should be required to maintain a

policy of health and accident insurance upon the minor child of
the parties as the same is available to them through their
respective places of employment.

Further, eacrir—o£ the parties

shall pay uii'i liulf uf any medical, dental, orthodontic,—optical
or related expenses not covered by insurance.
QINJI denial <yr/)erts<?s as uJell <xs or tlWoufv'c aw& c>^t\'^\ &xpenc*$ Art
id be. ptu'd by y-J\<_ c<Kft\t^>

<rA*.tU&\fe&6-k.
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9.
harassing,

Each of the parties

is restrained from

annoying,

or otherwise interfering in the lifestyle of the

other and further restrained from making any disparaging comments
to the minor child about each other or otherwise involving the
minor child in the issues between the parties.
10.

The Defendant shall be required to name the minor child
Prvbarthlu kid
this marriage as beneficiary of any life insurance pnrrhnnrd
by him or made available—Lu liifll—tluuuyh -hio omploimiQnjgfcto the

32>%

extent of JgS% of the value or death benefit thereof.
11.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$404.95 as child support payable in two equal monthly payments on
the 5th and 20th of each month commencing with July, 1989.
12.

The Defendant shall pay

to the Plaintiff the sum of

$150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly
payments on the 5th and 20th of each month commencing July, 1989.
13.

Plaintiff is not awarded judgment for back due house

payments against the Defendant.
14.

The Court authorizes the entry of a Qualified Domestic

Relations Order in this case to be submitted to the employers of
each of the parties awarding

each of

them one-half of the

retirement programs of the other accrued during the course of the
marriage including the Defendant's pension plan, claimed to be a
substitute for social security, and the retirement account which
8

Defendant claims belongs to West Jordan City among the others
testified to at trial.
15.

Each of the parties is entitled to one-half of the

individual retirement

account with accrued interest and the

parties are ordered forthwith to distribute that amount so that
each of the parties can •- choose their own retirement program,
16.

Each side should bear their own attorney's fees.

17.

Plaintiff is awarded her costs.

DATED this

day of

Approved as to form:

BRENT D. YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant

9
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STEPHEN G HOMER (1536)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Defendant-Petitioner Pro Se
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHE C HOMER,
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs
STEPHEN G HOMER,

Civil No. 87-2098

Defendant-Petitioner

Case assigned to Judge Harding

-J"--

Qjy..fe.

The Defendant-Petitioner STEPHEN G HOMER hereby petitions the
Court for a modification of the Decree of Divorce, entered October
1989, in the above-entitled action.
This Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is based
upon the following grounds:
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in August

1980.
2.

In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed this action

for divorce, seeking an absolute divorce upon grounds of
"irreconcilable differences", and obtained a restraining
order

requiring

the

Defendant-Petitioner

to

leave

permanently the marital residence.
3.

In October 1989 the Court entered a Decree of

EXHIBIT "B"

Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff the absolute divorce
requested

and ordered

the Defendant

to pay to the

Plaintiff $150.00 per month in alimony.
4.

Beginning in August 1989 and continuously each month

thereafter the Defendant has paid $1550.00 per month
alimony to the Plaintiff.
5.

Subsection 30-3-5(6) (h), Utah Code, provides:
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.

6.

There were and are no extenuating circumstances

which justify the continuing and future payment of
alimony.
7.

The Defendant-Petitioner is entitled to an Order

modifying

the

Decree

of

Divorce,

permanently

and

irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be
paid.
8.
this

Continued requirement of alimony, in any amount, in
case

deprives

the Defendant-Petitioner

of the

constitutional rights guaranteed him under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United

States

Constitution

and

under

the

uniform

operation of laws clause of Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution.
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STEPHEN G HOMER
ATTOWNEV AT LAW

WHEREFORE, Defendant-Petitioner prays for the following relief:
1.
of

That the Court enter an Order, modifying the Decree
Divorce

previously-entered

and

permanently

and

irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be
paid to the Plaintiff;
2.

That the Court award judgment in favor of the

Defendant-Petitioner for his attorney's fees and costs
incurred in bringing and prosecuting this Petition; and
3.

That the Court award such other relief as is just.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1999.

Plaintiff's address:
KATHE C HOMER
1015 East 500 North
Orem, Utah 84097
Defendant's address:
STEPHEN G HOMER
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

STEPHEN G HOMER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner
Suite 722, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-oooOooo-

KATHE C. HOMER,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioner,
v.
STEPHEN G. HOMER,

Civil No. 87-2098

Respondent.

Judge Ray Harding, Jr.
-oooOooo

Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian, moves
the Court to dismiss the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed by Respondent on
the following reasons and grounds set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed contemporaneously with this Motion.
DATED this _C_ day of August, 1999.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner

EXHIBIT MC"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _l£_ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to:

Stephen G. Homer
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088

Kristine Wimmer Berg
homer.mot
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner
Suite 722, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
KATHE C. HOMER,
Petitioner,

STEPHEN G. HOMER,
Respondent.

:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
OF DECREE OF DIVORCE

:

Civil No. 87-2098

:

Judge Ray Harding, Jr.

oooOooo
Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian,
submits the following in support of her Motion to Dismiss Petition for Modification of Decree
of Divorce.
Pertinent Facts
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by this

Court in October of 1989.
2.

Respondent was ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $150 per month until

such time as Petitioner remarried, cohabited or until the death of either party.
3.

Petitioner has not remarried or cohabited and both parties are still living.

EXHIBIT "D"

Argument
Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce should be dismissed for
several reasons.
First, the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted by this Court in that it fails to allege any substantial and material change
of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Second, the amendment to UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5, enacted by the legislature in 1995,
cannot be applied retroactively; rather its application is prospective only.
Third, the case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton.767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) is
analagous here. In that case, Mrs. Throckmorton sought to modify the Decree of Divorce to
claim one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. The trial court found that her claim
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Mrs. Throckmorton contended that Utah law did not
recognize pension benefits as marital assets subject to distribution at the time of the divorce.
She claimed that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982) recognized pension benefits as a marital asset, and that such recognition was in fact
a substantial change of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
The Court of Appeals, in concluding that the subsequent recognition of retirement
benefits was not a substantial change of circumstances, relied on the reasoning of the Arizona
Court of Appeals in the case of Guffev v. LaChance. 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634 (Ct. App.
1980). The Utah Court stated:
We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find that legal
recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce has
been entered is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change
2

of circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior property
division. Thus, we hold that the legal principles articulated in
Woodward, should only be given prospective application.
Id. at
Similarly, the statutory amendment limiting alimony to a period not to exceed the
duration of the marriage should not be given retroactive application.
WHEREFORE, Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce should be
dismissed, and Petitioner should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs she has incurred by
defending against it.
DATED t h i s ^ _ day of August, 1999.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

[$ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE to:

Stephen G. Homer
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088

Kristine Wimmer Berg
homer.mem
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of Utah County, State of Utah
.Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHE C. HOMER,
Plaintiff,
RULING

vs.
STEPHEN G. HOMER,
Defendant.

Case No. 87-2098
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree
of Divorce. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:
RULING
The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce was
entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum
of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and 20th of
each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each
month since August 1989.
At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony would
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a showing
that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide that
f,

[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the

EXHIBIT "E"
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marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
The Defendant contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires this
Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months
(from August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances
justifying the payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as
now required by the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to
pay alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h).
The Plaintiff responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply to this
action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly applies to
this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the
law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994 seeking
to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IdL at 441. In January 1996
the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. LI Between the filing of the original and
amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. IcL One effect of the 1995
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. IcL This raised the issue
of whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to
Ruling Page 2

the petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced
with the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive
change that could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the
petition to modify. M. at 443.
In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies retroactively
because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant action was
initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Defendant filed his Petition for Modification. Because
subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated, it applies
to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law.
However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive of the
issues raised in Defendant's Petition to Modify. The Defendant would have this Court
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony
entered prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the
marriage existed, unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the
statute requires. The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the
legislative intent behind the statute provide for such a result.
The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of
time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language of
the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the
Ruling Page 3
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power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case. Such a
result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. Furthermore,
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides
that an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously
entered alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering
orders awarding alimony. Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the
Divorce Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Petition for Modification should be dismissed
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe
the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge
all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055
(Utah 1991). Defendant's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that this
Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate
Plaintiffs alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Defendant has failed to allege any
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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The Defendant argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to terminate
the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states
that "[a]U laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Defendant reasons that
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in pre1995 divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons
under the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced
prior to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for the number of
years the marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances. However, the
Court finds that subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform
Operation of Law Clause because it does not create any type of classification.
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law
Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat
them differently. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does
not violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or
treat one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive
law regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for
a period longer than the marriage existed.
Furthermore, the Defendant is not now treated any differently under subsection (7)(h)
than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Defendant must meet in order
to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his Decree was
entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the movant to
"show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not originally
Ruling Page 5

contemplated within the decree itself/ Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified in
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable
power of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the
marriage existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional under either the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
The Defendant also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate his
obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why
the statute would violate this provision. The provision states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce
Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not bar
Defendant from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Defendant can petition this Court
for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i).
Ruling Page 6

Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11
of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is DISMISSED.

2.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this

ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.

DATED this

r

day of October; 1999
V^PSOJ^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage
prepaid thereon this I

day of November, 1999, to the following:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088
Helen E. Christian
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON
Suite 810 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Christopher D. Ballard
Law Clerk

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON
Attorney for Petitioner
Suite 810 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-7444
Telephone: (801) 531-8885
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo-

KATHE C. HOMER,
Petitioner,

FTNDINGS OF FACT AND
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

STEPHEN G. HOMER,
Respondent.

Civil No. 87-2098
Judge Ray Harding, Jr.
-ooOoo-

This matter comes before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce on Friday, October 29, 1999, before the
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr., Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court.

Petitioner,

KATHE C. HOMER, was present in person and represented by her counsel, Helen E. Christian.
Respondent, STEPHEN G. HOMER, was present in person and pro se- The Court heard the
arguments of counsel and took the matter under advisement for further determinations. The
Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, considered the oral arguments,
and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:
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Findings of Fact
1.

The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce

was entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the
sum of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and
20th of each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each
month since August 1989.
2.

At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony

would automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a
showing that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide
that "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
3.

The Respondent contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires

this Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months (from
August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances justisfying the
payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as now required by
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the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to pay alimony for a
period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h).
4.

The Petitioner responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply

to this action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly
applies to this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an
action is the law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,
442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994
seeking to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IcL at 441. In January
1996 the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. Id Between the filing of the original
and amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. Id One effect of the 1995
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. Id This raised the issue 6
whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to the
petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced with
the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive change that
could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the petition to
modify. Id at 443.
5.

In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies

retroactively because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant
action was initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Respondent filed his Petition for Modification.
Because subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated,
it applies to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law.
3

6.

However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive

of the issues raised in Respondent's Petition to Modify. The Respondent would have this Court
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony entered
prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the marriage existed,
unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the statute requires.
The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the legislative intent behind
the statute provide for such a result.
7.

The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the

number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period
of time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language
of the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the
power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case.; Such
a result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1.- Furthermore,
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides that
an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial material
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously entered
alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering orders
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awarding alimony. Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce
Decree and terminate Plaintiff s alimony award.
8.

Petitioner contends that Respondent's Petition for Modification should be

dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must
construe the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and
indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d
1055 (Utah 1991). Respondent's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that
this Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate
Petitioner's alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Respondent has failed to allege any
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
9.

The Respondent argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to

terminate the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment to
the United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states
that "[a] 11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Respondent reasons that
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in prel995
divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons under
the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced prior
5
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to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for the number of years the
marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances.. However, the Court finds that
subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform Operation of Law
Clause because it does not create any type of classification.
10.

The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law

Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat
them differently. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does not
violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or treat
one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive law
regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for a
period longer than the marriage existed.
11.

Furthermore, the Respondent is not now treated any differently under subsection

(7)(h) than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Respondent must meet
in order to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his
Decree was entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the
movant to "show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not
originally contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (UtahCt.
App.1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable power
6

of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the marriage
existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional under either the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
12.

The Respondent also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate

his obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why the
statute would violate this provision. The provision states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
I shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
UtahConst. Art. I, § 11.
13.

As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the

Divorce Decree and terminate Petitioner's alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not
bar Respondent from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Respondent can petition this
Court for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i).
Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11
of the Utah Constitution.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, this Court enters the following Order:
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Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is hereby DISMISSED.
DATED this 'gr /day of November, 1999.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby
notified that Petitioner's counsel will forward the original hereof to the Court for signature,
and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file any written
objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to Petitioner's
counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be signed and
filed.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE, this _%_ day of November, 1999, addressed to:
Stephen G. Homer
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088

Kristine Wimmer Berg
homer.ord
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